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The dramatic rise in the disability insurance (DI) roles in the last 20 years has
been the subject of much controversy in both popular and academic circles. While,
the relationship between DI and labor force participation has been the subject
of a growing literature, the mechanism of this transition from employment to DI
remains unclear. We hypothesize that one mechanism is the state-level adminis-
tration of the program which creates a classic principal-agent problem. This paper
analyzes the impact of continuing conﬂict of interests for Disability Determination
Services agencies—between Social Security Administration standards and state gu-
bernatorial political interests—interacted with the increased demand for disability
insurance as an alternative for low-skilled works during the period of 1982 to 2000.
We ﬁnd evidence that multi-term governors allow a greater fraction of applicants
than do ﬁrst term governors. We then develop a model that illustrates how these
diﬀerences can be due to the type of monitoring conducted by the Social Security
Administration. We provide additional evidence supporting this hypothesis in the
form of sub-group analysis by economic and political constraints. Overall, we ﬁnd
evidence that the monitoring system is counter-productive and encourages over-use
of the disability insurance program to serve political ends.
—————————————
Keywords: Disability insurance, principal-agent, social security administration, monitor-
ing
JEL classiﬁcation codes: H55, I18, I38, G22
∗London School of Economics, R.Iyengar1@lse.ac.uk
†Collegio Carlo Alberto and CeRP, giovanni.mastrobuoni@carloalberto.org.1 Introduction
The dramatic rise in disability insurance roles in the last 20 years has been the subject of
much controversy in both popular and academic circles. Provided by the Social Security
Administration (SSA), Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security 1 Both theory
and empirical evidence have found what appear to be labor market consequences from
the expansion of DI but with the general assumption that marginally able individuals are
able to enter DI when they are unable to ﬁnd employment with a suﬃciently high wage.
From this assumption there arises the question of whether the administrators of DI are
simply willing to expand DI enrollment during times of economic hardships or are simply
unable to distinguish between marginal candiates due to lack of evidence.
This study uses several facts about the DI program administrative procedure to deter-
mine the role political gaming by governors may play in expanding disability rolls. First,
as many scholars have noted, there is an inherent agency issue in the administration of
DI because it is fully federally funded but entirely state-administred. By law, disability
determinations are made by state agencies under contract with the Social Security Ad-
ministration. The head of this agency, the director of Disability Determination Services
(DDS), is appointed by the the governor and the staﬀ of this agency is comprised of state
employees. This naturally generates a conﬂict of interest for these agencies which depend
on the federal government for funding, but remain under the administrative and political
direction of state governors2. The observed linkage between unemployment rates and
gubernatorial popularity suggests that governs may have a strategic interest in reducing,
or appearing to reduce, the unemployment rate.3 Recent work by Wolfers (2005) puts a
1From the Annual Statistical Supplement, 2005
2Even popular guides such as Nolo’s Guide (2004) discuss the possibility that DDS directors may
be inﬂuenced by political concerns and thus amenable to more lenient allowance policies. In addition,
several reports by the Social Security Advisory Boards express concern over this conﬂict of interest.
3Cohen and King (2004) ﬁnd that when the state unemployment is lower than the national average,
governors lose political capital and face worse approval ratings. Approval ratings are important not only
2ﬁner point on this, illustrating that voters systematically make attribution errors regard-
ing responsibility for negative economic conditions. Thus governors may face political
fallout for economic conditions and may wish to use any mechanisms at their disposal
to improve the welfare and economic well-being of their constituents. Second, admission
into DI depends on the presentation of evidence that a worker is unable to work and
such evidence often involves evidence of injury or illness related pain. However, such
injuries and illnesses may be diﬃcult to observe for non-specialists, doctors typically pro-
vide evidence. The type of doctor and nature of evidence that is suﬃcient to determine
disability can vary the cost and diﬃculty in receiving and continuing to receive disability
beneﬁts. Third, the SSA during this period had very little direct oversight and only
period reviews.
Taken together facts one and two suggest that the if political actors, such as governors,
were suﬃciently motivated, there existed a mechanism by which disability rolls could be
expanded. This would have been quickly observed and corrected, however, were it not
for the lax monitoring and oversight by the SSA. Thus this paper address two questions
regarding the interaction between legal rulings, administrative procedures, and labor
market participation: First, to what extent did the rise of subjective admission criteria
allow political actors to inﬂuence DI enrollment? While evience that the rise in disability
occured after the 1984 liberalization of DI policies presented in Autor and Duggan (2002),
the question of to what extent this is related to political motives is diﬃcult to a certain
from aggregate trends. This is especially true for disability insurance which during many
time periods appears to have been administered in largely uniform ways. To answer this
question we therefore rely on the interaction between this discretionary period and the
style of monitoring used by the SSA. Using a simpliﬁed model of delegation, we illustrate
that a lax monitoring process can allow governors with a preference for higher allowance
because they are a key indication of re-election prospects (King 2001) but also because they expand the
executive’s ability to set their own policy agenda (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, 2002).
3rates to learn how much they can safely increase acceptance rates without consequences.
Because this learning occurs over time, we can compare multi-term governs to single-
term governors during the same time periods. We show that while DI rates began
rising as early as 1994, multi-term and single term governors rates did not begin to
diverge until 1986, when the introduction of evidence from treating physicians (rather
than SSA physicians) was allowed by a court ruling. The divergence continued to grow
until 1993 when evidentiary standards on pain were tightened and closed almost entirely
by 1996 when the SSA issued a set of unifying evaluation criteria. Second, what role
did this political inﬂuence on the disability determination process play in the growth of
the disability program? We ﬁnd evidence that during periods in which the returns to
expansion are high, for example governors face unfavorable economic or ﬁscal conditions,
the acceptance rates among multiple term governors is even higher. We also provide some
evidence that the diﬀerences we observe are due to a governor’s learning rather than a
selection mechanism by which governors with low allowance rates do not survive to later
terms. During the relevant time periods, the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, disability
insurance acceptance rates rose nearly 15 percent. Our results suggest that at least 10
percent of that increase is due to the gubernatorial inﬂuence on the allowance rates.
This paper thus provides an important contribution linking two strands of literature:
on vote buying and on labor market eﬀects of social welfare programs. In particular,
previous work has documented that that political pressure and institutional design can
combine to impact the administration of government programs. The results of this paper
thus corroborate a growing body of literature that highlights the importance of political
institutions on the public expenditure decisions and the use of spending to “buy oﬀ”
voters. 4 There is also substantial evidence regarding the impact of disability beneﬁts on
4In particular, there is evidence that political institutions matter for policy outcomes. In addition,
whether an oﬃcial is appointed or elected does impact the performance of these oﬃcials. See Besley
and Case (2003) for an overview on political institutions and expenditures and see for example Petzman
(1992) on vote buying behavior.
4labor force participation in the United States and internationally.5 While previous work
has systemtically documented both these issues, this paper provides a mechanism linking
the outcome of individual decisions (i.e. to avoid work for suﬃciently generous public
welfare alternatives) and political mechanisms that facilitate such behavior. In this case,
the steep rise in the number of individuals on disability insurance is clearly linked to the
rising acceptance rates. This increased acceptance rate could only occur when governors
had enough ﬂexibility in determination processes to allow more marginally disabled indi-
viduals onto disability rolls. The results of this paper thus indicate a important potential
mechanism that has been under-explored: the role of political institutions in facilitat-
ing issues of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance, tax and public welfare
provisions.
2 Background Information
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides income and medical beneﬁts to in-
dividuals eligible for disability insurance under the Social Securities Act (1935).6 The
provision of these beneﬁts occurs through two programs:
ˆ Social Security Disability Insurance (DI): Established under Title II of the Social
Security Act, DI is a social insurance program. It is intended to protect workers
who become disabled and therefore cannot (or at least cannot be expected to)
work. Thus, DI eligibility requires workers be previously employed.7 After age 65,
DI beneﬁts are converted to Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI).
5For example, Bound, 1989 ﬁnds only small disincentive eﬀects from DI. In contrast, Gruber and
Kubik, 1997 and Autor and Duggan, 2003, ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor force participation which
appears concentrated among the low-skilled.
6For many people, the true value of disability insurance is the entitlement to Medicare (for DI recip-
ients after a 2 year waiting period) and Medicaid (for SSI recipients).
7In fact, the program functions on a credit system which takes account of both how long an individual
worked and the time period an individual worked. The number of work credits needed for disability
beneﬁts depend on the age of disability.
5ˆ Supplementary Security Insurance (SSI): Established under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, SSI is means-tested, intended to protect individuals with limited
income and assets. SSI beneﬁciaries can continue to receive beneﬁts past age 65.
Both programs use the same health criteria to determine eligibility. The Social Secu-
rity deﬁnition requires that an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determined physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.”8 “Substantial gainful activity” is deﬁned as working on a regu-
lar and continuing basis and earning over
$830 a month (in 2005). 9 The disability must
be “demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
“This restriction is not overly strict in part due to the liberalization of the DI program
that occurred in 1984. Among other issues, this liberalization relaxed many of the re-
quirements that governed the determination process.10 Thus the criteria for disability,
while well-deﬁned, are not objective and leave room for discretion in the determination
process.
2.1 Funding and Administration
A crucial aspect of the Federal DI/SSI system is that it is federally funded but admin-
istered by the states. This administration occurs through the Disability Determination
Services (DDS) oﬃces in each state. These oﬃces are part of state governments and are
typically headed by an individual appointed by the governor. This agency manages the
disability insurance claims sent by the SSA ﬁeld oﬃce.
8Social Security Administration Disability Insurance “Red Book,” emphasis added
9It bears mentioning that the substantial gainful activity earnings restrictions only refer to money
obtained from working and does not restrict income from investments. Thus a disabled individual may
have income independent of his or her DI beneﬁts.
10This liberalization resulted in greater consideration of mental illness, increased weight placed on
symptoms such as pain, and acceptance of diagnoses and evidence from personal physicians of applicants,
among other changes. For greater discussion on the eﬀects of liberalization, see Autor and Duggan (2003)
6This state-based administrative mechanism was originally established to facilitate co-
ordination with existing state vocational rehabilitation agencies and to encourage physi-
cian acceptance and participation in the disability insurance program.11 However, state
management, subjective decisionmaking standards, and lack of federal oversight is be-
lieved to be responsible for the great deal of variation in the disability allowance rates.
State agencies are required to follow the regulations set for by the SSA, but there are
relatively few Federal requirements relating to their administrative practices. The agen-
cies follow state established personnel policies with respect to such matters as salaries,
beneﬁts, and educational requirements; do their own hiring; provide most of the training
for adjudicators; follow their own quality assurance procedures; and pay state-established
reimbursement rates for purchase of medical evidence. This results in diﬀerent training
and administrative practices that aﬀect the determination process.
Variation in training and practices is exacerbated by the increased subjectivity of
the determination process. Court decisions as well as changing perceptions about what
constitutes disability has resulted in a number of new policies that require individual
judgment by the those adjudicating disability applications. For example, all adjudicators
are required to assess such subjective factors such as the weight that should be given to
the opinion of a treating source and credibility with respect to allegations of pain and
other symptoms.12
Variation in health status, occupational composition, and demographics across diﬀer-
ent states would naturally give rise to diﬀerences in allowance rates. Determining the
source of such variation, however, is important because the administrative environment
leaves DDS agencies vulnerable to the inﬂuence of state-level political considerations.
Indeed a General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) report worried explicitly about the impact of
11A detailed discussion of the original and current structure of the DI program is available in Social
Security Advisory Board (2001)
12Court cases include Schisler v. Bowen, 787 F. Supp. 76 (2 Cir.1986), which dealt with treating
source opinion, and Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (4 Cir. 1986), which dealt with assessment of
pain.
7politics on disability determinations given that all DDS employees were state employees
working for an executive agency.13 Moreover, a state director of DDS stated, for exam-
ple, that he would “probably be discharged if he followed a strict interpretation of SSA
guidelines” (GAO 1978). Similarly another employee of a DDS oﬃce said, “We are state
employees; therefore, we don’t have to pay attention to what the SSA regional oﬃce . .
. or any other federal agency says” (GAO 1978, 7-8).
The structure of the disability system therefore establishes conﬂicting incentives for
states and the SSA. Unlike the federal government, which has an incentive to cost mini-
mize by reducing caseloads, state governors have an interest in increasing them. This is
for two reasons. First, if individuals applying for DI are denied they may apply for other
forms of social welfare for which states bear the cost. To the extent that governors seek
to cost-minimize with respect to their own social programs, they will attempt to admit
more marginally disabled individuals into the federal DI program. Second, the removal of
these individuals from the ranks of the unemployed may allow a change in the perception
of state level economic performance. This could aﬀect the governor’s political capital or
re-election prospects.
2.2 Legal History
The large growth in both the application and enrollment into the Federal Disability
Insurance prompted a set of Congressional legislative reforms in 1980 which formed the
backbone of the federal government’s eﬀort to deﬁne the scope and limit the growth of DI.
SSA was required to review a speciﬁed percentage of State DDS allowances and allowed
fo partial or complete take over from a State Disability Determination services (DDS) the
function of making disability determinations if the DDS fails to follow Federal regulations
and guidelines or if the State no longer wishes to make the determinations; required the
13GAO Report to Senator Jim Sasser (September 1985)
8agency to make own-motion reviews of ALJ decisions. Most notably, the reforms also re-
quired continuing disability reviews (CDRs) of DI beneﬁts for non-permanently disabled
beneﬁciaries at least every three years. In order to deﬁne the scope of improvement, the
Act also incorporated an amendment that was based on SSA’s policies on the evaluation
of pain. The amendments also contained a number of provisions designed to encourage
DI and SSI disability beneﬁciaries to return to work, including continuation of beneﬁts
while the beneﬁciary is in vocational rehabilitation, the disregard of certain work-related
expenses, and facilitated reentitlement to beneﬁts. The new rules established the need
for a standard of pain evaluation. During the application and appeals process, medical
evidence is critical to correctly identifying whether an individual can be categorized as
”disabled”. The procedures rely on evidence from three diﬀerence sources: the treating
physician, a consulting examiner, and a medical advisor. The weight given to the treat-
ing physician evidence relative to the other two sources may determine case outcomes
but until 1991 was not uniformly applied to disability determinations. (Schneider, 1996).
This formulation, often left ambiguous by the courts, could then be set at the state
level permitting greater variation in the evidence provided by the individual’s treating
physician, which was generally thought to increase the likelihood of acceptance. This is
because increased weighting of physician testimony allows the increased weight of subjec-
tive measures of pain and injury which treating physicians may testify to but government
sponsored doctors (such as consulting examiner or medical advisor) may be unable to
observe. The weighting of this testimony became an issue of contention between the SSA
and the Federal courts for almost 15 years. During that time period, changes in the
boundaries of SSA authority as well as the rights of disability applicants and recipients
generating changing standards of evaluation during the application and appeals process.
Based on divergence and later convergence in administrative rules regarding the weight
to treating physician testimony there are three distinct periods of rules: 1982-1985, 1986-
91992, and 1993-1996.
2.2.1 Period 1 (1982-1985): Uniform Standards on Evidence of Pain after
1980 Reforms
Despite the 1980 legislation, a large number of newly denied or failed continuiation cases
were being returned to DI by the courts. The reports of the Ways and Means and Finance
Committees on the 1980 amendments encouraged the courts to conform to new legislative
standards stating that the courts. In 1981 the courts responded in Finnegan v. Matthews.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Finnegan v. Mathews restricted SSA’s ability to
terminate SSI payments to beneﬁciaries who had been grandfathered into the SSI program
essentially counteracting the intention of the 1980 establishment of continuing disability
reviews. SSA issued a non-acquiescence ruling, deciding not to apply the decision, on
the grounds that the court’s standard would be impossible to administer. In 1982, The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Patti v. Schweiker respnded again that SSA could not
terminate beneﬁts to an SSI disability beneﬁciary unless it showed that the beneﬁciary’s
condition had improved. To remedy this, Congress provided for a due process hearing
to ensure legal standards of proof were met before termination of beneﬁts of disability
beneﬁciaries. The Ninth Circuit enjoined SSA to follow its rulings in Finnegan and Patti.
Given the courts response to the 1980 reforms and the sense that “the review process
mandated under the 1980 amendments...resulted in some signiﬁcant problems and dis-
locations which were not anticipated and which contributed to an unprecedented degree
of confusion in the operation of the program,” Congress passed the Disability Beneﬁts
Reform Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-460). The Disability Beneﬁts Reform Act increase the
evidentiary requirement necessary to demonstrate improvement and ability to work as
grounds to terminate beneﬁts.. This act also wrote into the law for a temporary period
SSA’s criteria for evaluating pain and required the consideration of the cumulative ef-
10fect of multiple disabilities.This law also attempted to establish uniform standards for
determining disability to apply at all levels of determination, review, and adjudication
based on a Health and Human Services, in conjunction with the National Academy of Sci-
ences, study regarding evidence of pain and pain management options. The importance
of physician testimony arose in 1980 with the legislative change and was then heightened
by the 1984 reforms. However, while the 1984 reforms formally relaxed previous stan-
dards, in practice it simply brought the administrative rules from SSA into agreement
with the Cirucit courts nationwide. Prior to the law change in 1984, a class action suit
in the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Hyatt , found SSA’s
policy regarding pain ran contrary to the Fourth Circuit law and enjoined the agency
from refusing to follow the law of the circuit. By the end of this year, every circuit court
had held that SSA should apply a medical improvement standard before terminating
disability beneﬁts. Rather than the 1984 legislative reforms, this study uses two changes
regarding the inclusion of treating physician evidence on pain and injury. While this issue
is subtle, its potential for altering determinations is quite signiﬁcant.
2.2.2 Period 2 (1986-1992): Variation in Legal Standards on Evaluation of
Pain and Physician Testimony
The second period was initiated by the the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (in Schisler
v. Heckler) which stated that a treating physician’s opinion on the subject of medical
disability is binding unless contradicted by substantial evidence. This legitimized a lower
court decision on the matter and moved the second district away from the uniform stan-
dards of testimony weight supported by the SSA. While the Supreme Court upheld the
SSA determination procedures in Bowen v. Yuckert (1986) which upheld SSA’s use of a
minimum threshold of medical disability in denying beneﬁts based on a non-severe impair-
ment at step two of the sequential evaluation process but was mute on the standards by
11which evidence in these procedures might be. Schisler introduced a much heavier weight
for treating physician testimony which also introduced increased confusion about the
1984 SSA guidelines. Thus, for governors interested in weighting testimony of physicians
could continue to do so. However, SSA maintained its the 1984 temporary amendment
on objective standards for evaluating pain which was largely thought to restrict the scope
of what constituted evidence of pain largely eliminating the role for testifying treating
physicians. Thus for governors closely following SSA rules, the combined eﬀect of the
1986 laws and SSA announcements was to overide the Schisler decision by maintaining
evaluation of pain standards and thus eliminate the increase likelihood of allowance from
treating physicians. Indeed, hoping to reduce the expansion of DI beneﬁts, the ruling
also provided guidance on how to develop evidence of pain and how to apply the policy
at each step of the sequential evaluation process.
This restriction prompted a second eﬀort to reduce state discretion and generate
uniformity, in 1988, SSA issued a new ruling on pain which restated the existing policy in
the 1984 amendments. Reviewing the Hyatt class action case, the District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina found that SSA’s published policies and instructions
on pain, including its 1988 ruling, did not conform to circuit law. The district court
ordered those policies and instructions to be cancelled and drafted a new ruling on pain
to be distributed to North Carolina adjudicators. Thus ended the second period and
ushered in the third period where after1989, the legalality of the pain standards were in
question reintroducing the importance of treating physician testimony
In 1991, the SSA issued new regulations on the evaluation of pain and other symptoms
and on the evaluation of opinions of claimants’ treating physicians. The pain regulation
restated existing policy and included guidance on how this policy would be applied dur-
ing the sequential evaluation process. The regulation on treating source opinion said the
agency would give controlling weight to such opinions when they were well supported
12by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and were not in-
consistent with other substantial evidence in the case record. Beginning in 1992 four
Statewide class action suits were ﬁled against State DDSs and/or SSA alleging that im-
proper policies and procedures were employed in making disability determinations. The
States involved were Iowa, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah. The issues included develop-
ment and consideration of treating source medical evidence and opinion; evaluation of
subjective symptoms, including pain; evaluation of credibility; appropriate use of vo-
cational resources and evaluation of vocational evidence; and Federal oversight of the
DDSs. All cases were settled with agreements which included redeterminations of certain
previously denied claims and ongoing communications with plaintiﬀs’representatives to
discuss concerns related to the disability determination process.
During this time period, four circuits were extremely vocal in their condemnation of
the SSA standards and the unwillingness of the SSA to acquiesce to previous court rulings:
the second circuit (NY, CT, VT), the fourth circuit (MD, WV, VA, NC, SC), the eight
circuit (ND, SD, NE, MN, IA, MO, AR) and the ninth circuit (MT, ID, NV, AZ, CA, OR,
WA, AK, HI). The opposition to the SSA mean states in the more controvertial circuits
faced increased scruity and even legal review of DDS decisions. Thus inadvertantly, these
circuit court stances on SSA administrative authority generated de facto variation in the
extent of monitoring on disability determiniations. 14
2.2.3 Period 4 (1993-1996): Uniﬁcation and Training on SSA Standards
The tide turned in 1993, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Schisler v. Sullivan found
that SSA’s 1991 regulations on the opinions of treating physicians, while they departed
in some ways from the court’s earlier opinion, were a valid use of the agency’s regulatory
power. Finally in 1996 SSA issued a set of nine Social Security rulings commonly called
14For detailed discussion of the response of various circuit courts to SSA standards as well as comparison
of appeals rates, see Haire and Lindquist, 1997
13process uniﬁcation rulings and provided training on the rulings for all disability adjudi-
cators. The subjects of the rulings included the weight to be given to treating source
opinions and other medical opinions, the evaluation of pain and other symptoms, the
assessment of credibility and residual functional capacity, and the application of Federal
court decisions.Thus after 1992, the discretion and uncertainty was ended and a uniform
treatment of pain evaluation and treating physician testimony was returned.
2.3 Monitoring and Oversight by the SSA
The major shift toward treating physician testimony and subjective evidence of pain
was thus introduced by various legistlative changes and court rulings in 1984, and con-
tinued through 1996. While the relaxation and later constriction of such subjectivity
would be less problematic if the SSA administred the programs but the independence of
State-administered DDS was compounded by the relatively lax oversight and monitoring
provided by the SSA.
Prior to 1972, SSA conducted pre-eﬀectuation review (PER) of all DDS decisions. In
1972, the federal review of DDS decisions was drastically reduced to a national sample of
ﬁve percent, conducted post-eﬀectuation of the decision. In 1980, Congress established
the Pre-Eﬀectuation Review (PER) giving SSA the authority to review a certain percent-
age of DDS decisions before they were paid. PER required a review of 15 percent of Title
II (DI) and concurrent (DI/SSI) allowances in 1980, 35 percent in 1982, and 65 percent
in 1983 and beyond. Today, the PER sample is a sample of 50 percent of all Title II (DI)
and concurrent Title II/XVI (DI-SSI) initial allowances prior to eﬀectuation of payment.
Of the 50 percent of cases selected for review, 45 percent are targeted based on the proﬁle
and 5 percent are randomly selected (these are the Title II and concurrent Title II/XVI
initial and reconsideration allowances selected for a quality assurance review). PER is
mandated by law and has been updated to identify and sample the most error-prone cases
14for review.
In addition to the PER, the 1980 Social Security Amendments also gave SSA author-
ity to set performance standards for DDSs with the option of taking over DDS work-
loads, if they failed to meet those standards. The 1980 Amendments also mandated that
non-permanent disability cases must be reviewed every three years (continuing disability
reviews (CDRs)). As a result of the 1980 Amendments, SSA established a DDS perfor-
mance accuracy threshold of 90.6 percent combined accuracy rate for initial allowances
and denials and began undertaking quality assurance reviews (QARs). The 90.6 percent
level was somewhat arbitrarily chosen, based on the fact that it represented one and one-
half standard deviations from the mean accuracy rate at that the time. If a state DDS
initial allowance or denial accuracy falls to 90 percent or less, sampling of the deﬁcient
stratum is increased to 140 cases per quarter (reduced from 196 in May, 2000) and remains
at that level until the accuracy rate improves.15 In addition, the SSA requires DDSs meet
standards of timeliness, with the target case processing time of 49.5 calendar days or less
for DI applicants and 57.9 days or less for SSI applicants. If a DDS has an accuracy rate
of less than 90 percent for two consecutive quarters but meets the timeliness standards,
SSA has the discretion to decide to provide technical and management assistance (TMA).
If a DDS has an accuracy rate of less than 90 percent and fails to meet one of the time-
liness requirements, it is deemed to have “unacceptable performance level” and the SSA
must provide TMA. If after 1-2 years performance is still unacceptable, the SSA can take
over the administration of DI determinations in that state. Although the SSA has the
statutory authority to assume responsibility for conducting disability determinations for
a state, it has never exercised this authority. The apparent reason for this is the possible
political ramiﬁcations to the governors of such a move. Lewin (2001) suggests that exer-
15State DDS performance and compliance with federal policy is measured by the ﬁndings of the QARs.
Only Group I deﬁciencies (a decisional deﬁciency with suﬃcient documentation to support an opposite
decision; or a documentation deﬁciency where the medical documentation is not suﬃcient to support
any disability decision.) are used in the calculation of performance accuracy provided that the DDS also
failed to meet processing time standards for either Title II or Title XVI.
15cise of this authority was considered under the Reinvention of Government II initiative,
in 1996, and rejected for such reasons. However, it may also be the case that no state has
ever deviated a suﬃcient amount for a long enough period of time to warrant a takeover.
In this case, the threat of takeover may be suﬃcient to induce state governors to apply
subjective admission criteria only up to an existing threshold level.
3 Data
This study links Social Security Administration data from 1982 through 2000 to data on
political variables collected by Besley and Case (1995) and information on case law in
various federal districts.
The disability application variables, reported in Panel A of Table 1, include appli-
cations and allowance rates for individuals who apply for DI or SSI separately as well
as individuals who apply for DI and SSI combined. The allowance rate is deﬁned as
the number of approved applications at the DDS level divided by the total number of
applications. The denominator of this outcome is reported as the number of applications
for DI and SSI separately as well as combined DI/SSI applications. Table 1 shows that
about 43 percent of DI claims and 40 percent of SSI claims are accepted. Moreover, this
number has been increasing over time. In 1982 only about 35 percent of DI applications
and 33 percent of SSI applications were accepted. This rose to a peak of 49 percent of
DI applicants and 47 percent of SSI applicants in 1992.
State demographic and economic variables are reported in Panel B of Table 1. The
unemployment rate averaged about 6 percent during this period though in the post-
liberalization period (after 1984) it was on average only about 5.5 percent. States vary
a great deal in their unemployment rate, however. For example, during that time period
both West Virginia (in 1985) and Louisiana (1986) had unemployment rates well over 10
percent. In contrast, in those years New Hampshire and Massachusetts had unemploy-
16ment rates of well below 5 percent. Similarly, 25 percent of the population lives below
150 percent of poverty. However, this varies widely as some states less than 10 percent of
the population lives below 150 percent of poverty (Connecticut) and in some states over
40 percent of the population lives below poverty (Mississippi). These factors are useful
in illustrating the reason why, due to various economic factors, states are likely to diﬀer
widely in their allowance rates and the political value of a higher allowance rate.
Another source of variation in the demand for disability insurance is the relative
value of DI payments. There is considerable variation in the DI replacement rate (i.e.
the average DI payment/ the average wage) as well as the unemployment insurance (UI)
replacement rate (i.e. the average UI payment/ the average wage). There is also variation
in the number of people without health insurance (on average 75 percent, but as low as
55 percent.) This is particularly relevant because individuals are eligible for Medicare 24
months after an individual is deemed disabled. These factors regarding access to public
welfare may also inﬂuence demand and thus the political value of disability insurance.
The political variables are reported in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive
variables about the governors. About 60 percent of the state-years have governors serving
their ﬁrst term in oﬃce. About 30 percent of the state-years have governors serving their
second term in oﬃce. About 49 percent of the state-years have democratic governors.
The average governor is about 54 years old. In addition to the descriptive variables in
Panel A, we also report some outcome variables in Panel B. Only about 13 percent of
incumbents lose re-election (either in a primary or a general election). About one-quarter
of the sample are ineligible for another term. Another 17 percent were eligible to run,
but did not do so. Thus governors who did not get re-elected even though they were
eligible for re-election represent about 30 percent of the sample. On average, winning
governors won about 57 percent of the votes, but some won with as little as 35 percent
of the vote. Only about 6 percent of the sample won by a margin of greater than 10
17percentage points.
Panel C of Table 2 reports rules which may limit gubernatorial power. Over 80
percent of the sample has gubernatorial line-item veto, where the governor can eliminate
individual items in omnibus legislation. Only 20 percent of the sample has supermajority
requirements to approve tax increases. 45 percent of the sample has indexed limits on tax
and expenditure changes but only 25 percent of the sample has limits that are restrictive.
Panel D of Table 2 reports other political variables relevant for gubernatorial political
power. In 16 percent of the sample, one party received more than 60 percent of the
vote indicating strong party ties. On average, 57 percent of state senate members and
56 percent of state house members are democrats and indeed about 56 percent of the
sample has a democratic legislature. In general, democrats are believed to be associated
with higher government spending and in general ﬁscal laxness. However, we ﬁnd evidence
of a signiﬁcantly negative relationship between having a democratic legislature and the
fraction of expenditures that are deﬁcit funded. About 20 percent of the state senate
members and 14 percent of state assembly members are women and again, there appears
to be little correlation with government expenditures. Higher fractions of women in
political oﬃce are sometimes thought to indicate the political liberalness of an area and
would be associated with higher spending levels. We ﬁnd evidence that a higher fraction of
women is associated (in a marginally signiﬁcant sense) to higher rates of deﬁcit spending.
Finally, about 48 percent of the sample has a split government, where the governor
and the majority of the legislature are of opposite parties. It is typically thought that
split governments are more ﬁscally conservative. We ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant
relationship between split government and deﬁcit spending.
Panel D also reports the relationship between the governor’s party and the current
president’s party. The relationship between the governor and president’s party may relate
to career concerns of governors. For example, if a governor is too extravagant in allowances
18for his or her state, then while there is little consequence for within state politics, there
may be reputation consequences in national politics. Nearly 40 percent of the sample has
governors who are of the same party as the president. Of the 60 percent of the sample
in which the governors and presidents are of opposite parties, about 23 percent have
republican governors and democratic presidents. The political party may be important
if there are diﬀerent reputational and electoral consequences for higher welfare spending
by political party.
4 A Model of Gubernatorial Learning
To motivate the need for a theoretical model, we ﬁrst consider the trends in disability
insurance and the extent to which these trends suggest gubernatorial behavior may be
relevant factor in disability determinations. Previous work has extensively documented
the trends in DI and the role that this has played in US unemployment rates (Autor and
Duggan 2003). Using a similar data, it is clear that increases in both acceptance rates
and application rates contributed to the expansion of the disability program.Figures 1
and 2 illustrate the DI application rates (per 100,000) and allowance rates (respectively)
from 1982 until 2000. These ﬁgures show the rates of ﬁrst-term governors and single term
governors in the solid and dashed lines respectively. Between 1982 and 1990 application
rates are largely ﬂat in both single term and multi-term governors and if anything, slightly
(though not signiﬁcantly) higher among ﬁrst term governors. Despite this relatively
constant application rate, allowance rates increased steadily from 1982-1986 among both
single term and multi-term governors. The divergence between single and multi-term
governors’ allowance rates begin in 1986and continue through 1996. Although allowance
rates decline in states with multi-term governors between 1986 and 1988, these rates
remain constant among multi-term governors. After 1998, both groups dramatically
increase allowance rates, though somewhat more rapidly among multi-term governors,
19until 1992 and then rapidly reduce allowance rates until 1996. Application rates, on the
other hand, appear to largely co-move for both single term and multi-term governors,
increasing steadily through 1994 and then decreasing after 1994. After 1996, disability
insurance allowance rates once again rise, while application rates continue to fall.
The timing correspondence between allowance rates and legal ruling and lack of corre-
spondence between applications and allowance rates raises two potential factors that may
aﬀect the adjustment of DI allowance rates by governors. The ﬁrst is ﬂexibility. Even if
a governor wishes to adjust allowance rates for political purposes, he or she cannot do so
if there are clearly objective standards for application acceptance. Thus the introduction
of increased ﬂexibility after 1986 increased the potential for governors to increase the
allowance rates for political reasons. However, a likely second factor is that probability
of detection. If SSA monitoring was perfect, then such deviations in allowance rates
would be detected with a high probability. If there are political consequences for such
detection (e.g. reputational consequences) governors will not tend to deviate from the
targeted allowance rate. Put another way, for a ﬁxed penalty from the SSA, an increased
probability of detection should reduce the willingness of governors to deviate from the
targeted allowance rate. To test this we compare states in which the federal circuit ac-
quiesced to the SSA rulings (and saw less review and appeal and we refer to as ” low
monitored”) to states which did not acquiesce (and saw greater review and thus we refer
to as ”strictly monitored”). We ﬁnd evidence consistent with this theory. Figure 2A
shows allowance rates in strictly monitored states. There is little divergence between
single ter and multi-term governors (except in 1990) and frequent crossing of the two
lines. In contrast, ﬁgure 2B shows allowance rates for low monitored states. In these
states, while ﬁrst-term governors appear to increase and decrease their allowance rates,
multi-term governors appear to either hold steady or increase allowance rates. In
A question that then must be answered is why single term governors do not adjust
20to lax monitoring in the same way as multi-term governors–i.e. why do single term
governors appear to reduce allowance rates even when monitoring is relatively low. A
key issue may be the information governors have about the targeted rate from the SSA and
what allowance rate level constitutes a small versus a large deviation from the targeted
rate. Second term and later governors have much more information having had signals
from the SSA and therefore adjust DI rates much more as economic/political needs arise.
information about the likelihood of detection. First term governors may be wary of
moving DI allowance rates in because they do not have enough information about how
the Social Security Administration will react. Thus we see much more movement and
larger diﬀerences by governor term length during periods of little scrutiny and reduced
monitoring. To more formally illustrate this, we develop a simple model of strategic
behavior between a governor and the SSA.
4.1 Basic Setup
To begin, suppose the governor has utility U (x), where x = a − assa and represents the
diﬀerence between the allowance rate set by the governor (a) and SSA’s desired allowance
rate (assa). SSA observes x. SSA can take one of three actions: i) do nothing, ii) send
a warning (s = 1), and iii) impose technical and management assistance or completely
take over the administration (in short take over, t = 1). To decide which action to take,
SSA follows these rules:
ˆ send a warning if x > c − ∆ (i.e. deﬁne a variable such that s = 1(x > c − ∆))
ˆ take over disability determination if x > c (i.e. deﬁne a variable such that t =
1(x > c)).
In these rules c represents the cost to the SSA of taking over any DDS and ∆ is the
amount by which SSA shades the true costs of takeover in order to ensure compliance.
21For illustrative purposes we will treat ∆ as exogenously given.16 Assume that governors
know ∆, but don’t know c.17 That is, we assume that governors know how much SSA
will shade by but they do not know the true cost of takeover. Also, assume that if x > c
governors utility is zero (i.e. U(x) = 0 for) the period and any period after. That is
governors receive zero utility in this period and future periods if SSA takes over and as
such governors will always avoid setting x > c.
In a one period model the governor weights the utility gain from setting a higher
acceptance rate against the increase in the probability of takeover.18 In a two period
model, however, information is transmitted based on the SSA’s action in the previous
period. The governors will therefore maximize their utility over both periods, i.e.
max
x0,x10,x11 U (x0,x10,x11) = Pr(t0 = 0)U (x0) + Pr(t0 = 0,t1 = 0,s = 0)U (x10) (1)
+Pr(t0 = 0,t1 = 0,s = 1)U (x11).
where x0 is the diﬀerence between SSA’s desired allowance rate and the allowance rate
set by the governor at time τ = 0, x10 is the diﬀerence between SSA’s desired allowance
rate and the allowance rate set by the governor at time τ = 1 if the governor does
not receive a warning, and x11 diﬀerence between SSA’s desired allowance rate and the
allowance rate set by the governor at time τ = 0 if the governor receives a warning.
16An interesting extension to this model is one in which ∆ is also a choice parameter strategically set
to induce maximal compliance.
17Assuming that ∆ is also unknown does not alter the results, while if the governor knows c, x = c,
an uninteresting case.




224.2 Solving the Governor’s Maximization Problem
Suppose that c has a known distribution, F(c), which admits a density f(c). Substituting
in the distribution function for the probabilities, the expected utility in 1 simpliﬁes to:
[1 − F (x0)]U (x0) + [1 − F (x10)]U (x10) + [F (x0 + ∆) − F (x11)]U (x11) (2)
Suppose the governor maintains the administration of the disability program (i.e.
t0 = 0,t1 = 0,s = 1) and he received a warning, then x11 is implicitly deﬁned by:
argmax
x1 P (c > x11|c > x0,s)U (x) = (1 − F (x11|x0 < c < x0 + ∆))U (x11) (3)
The ﬁrst order condition from equation 3 is:
(1 − F (x11|x0 < c < x0 + ∆))U1 (x11,α) − f (x11|x0 < c < x0 + ∆)U (x11) = 0
or more simply:
(F (x0 + ∆) − F (x11))U1 (x11) − f (x11)U (x11) = 0 (4)
In a parallel manner the governor’s strategy in the state of the world where there is
no warning at time (i.e. t0 = 0,t1 = 0,s = 0) is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order
condition:
(1 − F (x10))U1 (x10) − f (x10)U (x10) = 0 (5)
Let x∗
10 and x∗
11 be the solutions to these two maximization problems. We can then
rewrite equation 2 as:
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with corresponding ﬁrst order condition:
0 = [1 − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) (7)
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In equation 7, x0∗
10 (x0) is the change in the second period solution (without warning)
with respect to x0, and similarly x0∗
11 (x0) is the change in the second period solution (with
a warning) with respect to x0.
Note that these ﬁrst order conditions (equations 4, 5, and 7) cannot be simultaneously
satisﬁed. If all there are satisﬁed that implies that
0 = [1 − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) + f (x0 + ∆)U (x
∗
11) (8)
Deﬁne G(x0) = [1 − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0). Equation 8 then implies that
G(x0 < 0). However, we have assumed G(x∗
10) = 0. Because of the regularity condition
G(z) is decreasing, implying that x∗
10 < x0, which cannot be optimal. Governors will
never set x1 < x0 if there was no takeover in the initial period (i.e., governors should
always set x1 ≥ x0).
Consider a case where governors choose the interior solution if they do not receive a
warning, so that G(x∗
10) = 0. If there is a warning instead, governors pursue the safest
24strategy and maintain the same acceptance rate in the second period (i.e. if s = 1, then
x∗
11 = x0). In this situation, we can rewrite the ﬁrst order condition:
0 = G(x0) + [F (x0 + ∆) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) + f (x0 + ∆)U (x0) (9)
In order for equation 9 to hold, G(x0)+[F (x0 + ∆) − F (x0)]U1 (x0)−f (x0)U (x0) <
0. Since x∗
10 > x0 and G(z) is decreasing in z, we know that G(x0) > 0. This implies
that F (x0 + ∆) − F (x0)U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) < 0.
Note however that this implies that:
G(x0) − |[F (x0 + ∆) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0)| > 0 ⇒
G(x0) − (−{[F (x0 + ∆) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0)}) > 0 ⇒
G(x0) + [F (x0 + ∆) − F (x0)]U1 (x0) − f (x0)U (x0) > 0
Thus there does not exist an interior solution where after a warning the governor will
set the acceptance rate at the same level. Intuitively this results indicates that because
governors know they still have some room to increase their acceptance rates and the
warning itself does not impose any costs (so getting another warning without a takeover
is costless), it is not optimal for them to simply maintain the status quo when given a
warning.
Next, consider a case where governors choose the optimal x1 if they receive a warning
(i.e. the ﬁrst order condition for x∗
11is satisﬁed). If there is no warning, governors simply
increase by ∆ (i.e. x∗
10 = x0 + ∆). Note that since ∆ is known, and the strategy of the
SSA is known, governors know they can safely increase by ∆ and still avoid takeover.
Additionally, G(x∗
11) > 0. Since we know that x∗
11 > x0, this implies that G(x0) > 0. The
ﬁrst order conditions can then be written as:
250 = G(x0) + G(x0 + ∆) + f (x0 + ∆)U (x
∗
11) (10)









The ﬁrst condition can be satisﬁed if G(x0 + ∆) is suﬃciently negative. In this case,
governors will always choose x11 > x0 and the warning by the SSA simply dictates the
magnitude of the increase.19
4.3 Summary of the Model Results
The strategic model suggests that for a given governor, acceptance rates in the second
period should be at least as large as in the ﬁrst period. This comes simply from the
relatively simplistic monitoring and penalty tools used by the SSA in which warnings
indicate signiﬁcant deviations, and thus allow governors to impose minor adjustments
and avoid any additional penalty. First term governors, however, will not have the
beneﬁt of this warning and thus must start from scratch, setting allowance rates with
no information on the SSA’s targeted allowance rate level. Note also that this model
illustrates that the utility from deviation is going to be a key in determining the extent of
deviaton a governor may wish to impose in either the ﬁrst or second period, conditional
on a given expected penalty level. However, as the penalty level adjusts, for a given
utility level, governors will seek to minimize the distance between the allowance rate they
set in the ﬁrst period and the perceived SSA targeted allowance rate. Thus we have three
main predictions:
1. For a given governor, allowance rates should be weakly increasing over time.
19Whenever it is not satisﬁed, there are no interior solutions in the second period and the two boundary
solutions are x∗
11 = x0, x∗
10 = x0 + ∆.
262. For a given penalty level, governors should set higher allowance rates if the returns
to doing so are higher. This tendency will be exaggerated the more information a
governor has about the targeted allowance rate of the SSA (and thus for multi-term
governors).
3. For a given utility level, governors should set lower allowance rates as the proba-
bility of detection increase. This tendency will be reduced the more information a
governor has about the target allowance rate of the SSA (and thus for multi-term
governors).
Predictions 2 and 3 hinge on the idea that the greater the uncertainty, the more gov-
ernors must worry that their targeted increase will trigger a penalty and warning. With
perfect information the governor can set the maximum allowance rates at the target rate
plus the cost of take-over. Thus, the more information a governor has about the SSA
targeted rate, the less uncertainty around the maximum increased allowance rate a gov-
ernor may impose without incurring the penalty. This will thus increase deviations when
the returns are higher (because the expected costs are lower) but also reduce the eﬀects
of changes in the probability of detection because the space over which that detection
may occur is smaller.
.
5 Results on Changes in Disability Insurance Al-
lowance Rates
To test this model and determine how realistic and substantial such behavior appears
to be, we test the three predictions sequentially. To do this, we consider the eﬀect on
allowance rates and then verify that there does not appear to be signiﬁcant changes in
application rates. We begin with a parsimonious speciﬁcation regressing allowance rates
27on a linear years in oﬃce variable with state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The results of this
regression are reported in column (1) of Table 3. Each additional year of oﬃce increases
allowance rates by about 0.13 or about half a percent each year. This estimate appears to
be robust to the inclusion of a range of state-time varying covariates including labor force
participation, average income, poverty rate and demographic controls (results reported
in column 2). It also does not appear very sensitive to estimation type or corrections
for serial correlation. Column (3) reports a speciﬁcation using a two-step feasible GLS
estimator and assuming an AR(1) process for the error terms. The coeﬃcient is more
precisely estimated but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the OLS estimates. Given the
strong prediction of the model that learning implies a given governor should increase
allowance rates, we estimate a speciﬁcation with governor and year ﬁxed eﬀects (note
that state ﬁxed eﬀects will be subsumed in the speciﬁcation). The coeﬃcient doubles in
size, suggesting that the state-year ﬁxed eﬀects model between governor variation masked
some of the growth in allowance rates within a given governor over time. Indeed it
appears that governors increase the allowance rates by almost 1 percent each year. While
not substantial in any given year, the average tenure of a governor is 4.4 years so this
suggests that any given governor may raise allowance rates by nearly 5 percent during his
or her period in oﬃce. This speciﬁcation also suggests that this may not be purely due to
governor electoral survival. It does not appear that there are high and low allowance rate
governors and that high allowance governors simply have longer term lengths. Rather, it
appears that for a given governor, as they are in oﬃce longer, they relax the standards
for admission into disability insurance. To further support this, we restrict the sample
to multi-term governors only and estimate the governor ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation again.
From the results reported in column (5), it appears that the coeﬃcient is now twice that
of the state-year ﬁxed eﬀect pooled model reported in column (2). Overall it appears
that governors increase the allowance rates over time, and this appears true even when
28considering only multi-term governors. A model of electoral success would suggest that
when restricting to multi-term governors, the tenure in oﬃce should have no eﬀect on the
overall allowance rate. Thus the results appear more consistent with a model of learning
over time.
To consider how realistic our interpretation of learning might be, we next turn to the
means that governors have to adjust disability allowance rates. Changes in the policy,
training and other factors which may inﬂuence determination procedures are typically
established by the director of DDS, a political appointee.20 If governors are somewhat
constrained in changing the appointment during the term time, we would expect this
learning eﬀect to be stiﬂed in the ﬁrst term and more prominent in later terms. To test
this, we include separate eﬀects for ﬁrst-term years and later term years in oﬃce. Indeed
it appears that most of the eﬀect is concentrated in the later years in oﬃce. This results
is especially indicative because there is state level variation in the number of years in
a given term. Thus governors who have been in oﬃce for anywhere ranging from 2 to
6 years will be “multi-term” governors if their state has shorter or longer term-lengths.
Additionally note that the eﬀect is even greater if the previous governor was of the same
party. While the signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient is sensitive to speciﬁcation, it is consistent
with a story of gubernatorial learning about the SSA targeting and monitoring strategy.
If it is the case that governors of the same party are more likely to share information
and staﬀ than governors of diﬀerent party, then we would expect some persistence in the
learning if a new governor succeeds someone from his or her own party.
A natural concern is that this diﬀerence in allowance rates over a governor’s tenure
reﬂects a change in the underlying application base. The governor ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁca-
tion in part suggests this is not the case since for any given governor term length, there
20The Director of Disability Determination Services is typically appointed by the governor and ap-
proved by the legislature. The SSA has no oﬃcial input into the nomination or appointment of these
individuals. Some states have considered this oﬃce suﬃciently important that the Director of DDS sits
on the governor’s cabinet.
29are a range of states and years in which any given governor may be single or multiple
term governor. However, if the underlying applicant base is changing with the guberna-
torial electoral cycle, this will pose a problem for our identiﬁcation. To explicitly test
this, we estimate a governor ﬁxed eﬀect model using applications per 1000 people (in a
state-year). We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect and the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is extremely
small. Given that there does not appear to be change in the application rates across term
lengths or in later term, there is less concern that the dependent variable of allowance
rates (which is allowances divided by applications) could be changing due to changes in
the application pool. Nevertheless, we also estimate the governor ﬁxed-eﬀects model
using allowances per 1000 in the population–which does not have the same problem of a
potentially dynamically responsive denominator. We ﬁnd similar eﬀects with a slightly
less than one percent per year increase in allowances per 1000 in later term governors.
Overall the results appear consistent with learning model prediction that learning, rather
than changes in the underlying pool of DI applications, may be responsible for changes
in allowance rates for speciﬁc governors over time.
The next prediction of the model is that for a given penalty level, the governor will
increase allowance rates if the return to doing so is higher. Conditional on a given
penalty level, governors may be willing to risk detection if they are more constrained in
vote-buying tools. To test this we consider state laws which reduce the ﬁscal freedom
of governors. There are two such laws which we consider: ﬁrst, some states have laws
in which there is a tax and expenditure limitation. At some point during the sample,
twenty-ﬁve states have a law of this sort with 6 states changing the law during the 18 year
sample span. Second, some states have laws in which a supermajority of the legislature is
required to approve any funding increase. This again limits the ability of the governor to
expand state-funded programs for political returns. During the sample period, 13 states
have such laws and 6 changed their laws during the sample period. A separate potential
30restriction on the ability to pass state-funded bills may be if the government is split, i.e.
the party of the governor is diﬀerent from the party of the legislative majority.
The model of gubernatorial learning has implications for the usage of DI as a political
tool. While there are gains from using DI, if it indeed serves as a vote-buying mech-
anism, it is also risky. Because c is unknown, governors who are not constrained from
otherwise addressing economic conditions may prefer not to use expand DI maximally
while governors who are constrained either through political institutions or economic fac-
tors may be forced to increase allowance rates more than they might otherwise. While
a good deal of the political economy literature focuses on unemployment and political
outcomes, it is equally plausible that governors who are constrained from social welfare
spending through political institutions may use DI as a means to improve the well-being
of individuals in their state.
To further explore the relationship between necessity and allowance rates, we estimate
regressions with state and year ﬁxed eﬀects within various sub-samples. The results,
reported in Table 5, highlight how as governors are constrained, either through economic
conditions or political institutions, they are more likely to use DI as a means of public
welfare. Column (1) of Table 5 provides estimates for the full sample. In states with high
unemployment rates (i.e. higher than the national median) multi-term governors have an
even higher allowance rate. This ﬁts with the theory that governors may be using DI as
free (from a state budget perspective) way of dealing with adverse economic shocks. The
same is not true for high deﬁcit spending states. First-term governors in states which
ﬁnance a higher percentage of their expenditures through deﬁcits have almost the same
acceptance rate as the full sample.
In states with restrictions on tax and expenditure increases and especially in states
with supermajority requirements for new tax or expenditure laws, ﬁrst-term governors
have substantially lower acceptance rates relative to multi-term governors than the sample
31as a whole. This is suggestive of a more “risky” use of DI at times when governors may be
constrained from passing other legislation. If higher acceptance rates increase the chance
of SSA takeover, then the amount governors increase the acceptance rates by in their
second term will be inﬂuenced by their ability to pass other interventions (obviating the
need for a large increase in DI acceptances).21
Note that republican governors have an even higher allowance rate than the average
multi-term governor. This may be related to two factors. First, republican governors
may be in states in which there is a greater distaste for state spending and tax increases.
This means that the governor has few options if he or she wishes to expand social protec-
tion. Second, republican governors career concerns may be such that higher state deﬁcits
are more detrimental than greater usage of federal programs. As a result, republican
governors appear to be quite willing to use federal public welfare programs.
While there appear to be raw diﬀerences in the acceptance rates by term length, this
could be related to political survival and political savviness. In order to test this, we
estimate a set of speciﬁcations with governor ﬁxed eﬀects. In these speciﬁcation, single
term governors who are never re-elected are absorbed by the governor ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus,
identiﬁcation for the ﬁrst-term eﬀect comes from comparing governors in their ﬁrst term
to later terms, essentially treating multi-term governors as panel observations on the
same individual. Table 6 reports a comparison of estimates using governor ﬁxed eﬀects
to those using state ﬁxed eﬀects. The DI only allowance rate is still lower for ﬁrst term
governors relative to second term governors but the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. However, the
eﬀect among concurrent applicants (columns (6)) and indeed among the total number
of DI applications (not reported) actually increases. Moreover if a governor cannot run
again (he or she is prevented by term limit laws), the eﬀect is also larger in the governor
21The speciﬁcations reported in Table 5 use individual subgroups for clarity of discussion. Results
from a pooled regression are similar and there are no signiﬁcant interactive eﬀects between the subgroups
(although there are likely too few observations to get suﬃcient statistical power to identify any interactive
eﬀects).
32ﬁxed eﬀects setting, providing additional evidence of career concerns.
As a ﬁnal robustness check we show that changes in the distribution of disability are
not able to explain these diﬀerences. In Table 7 we regress the diﬀerences in the Log-
Number of DI beneﬁciaries for each diagnostic type on the multi-term dummy variable.
Less that 5 percent of the diagnostic types show signiﬁcant diﬀerences between ﬁrst and
multi-terms governors. This ﬁnding also suggest that applicants are probably unaware
of the diﬀerences in allowance rates across terms. Otherwise, marginal applicants, who
often report musculoskeletal or back-pain problems, would have an incentive to apply
when allowance rates are higher.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our results provide fairly strong evidence that governors in their second term allow higher
acceptance rates for federal Disability Insurance (DI). We believe this ineﬃciency is due
to the inherently imperfect principal-agent situation set up the by the administration
of DI. In particular, because the federal government funds DI but to a large extent
leaves the management and administration to state government, there is broad scope for
gubernatorial discretion to inﬂuence the allowance rates. The irony of such a scenario
is that the monitoring by the Social Security Administration (SSA) actually serves to
inform governors about the extent to which they can costlessly increase DI. The evidence
presented here suggests that the same governors, over time, will increase their allowance
rates once they learn how much room they have to increase the rates.
We also provide some evidence conﬁrming the vote-buying use of DI by comparing
governors who have a greater incentive or need to use DI as a political tool. In particular,
we ﬁnd that governors with higher than average unemployment rates have even larger
eﬀects in their ﬁrst term. Moveover, governors who are restricted in their ability to
pass social welfare programs (either because of political institutions or a split with the
33legislature) have even higher DI allowance rates after the ﬁrst term. This is consistent
with our model of learning and also suggests that there may indeed be some costs to
using DI as a vote-buying mechanism.
The results of this paper provide some insight into the ways in which DI adminis-
tration can be responsible for reduced labor force participation. In a world with perfect
information and monitoring, governors could not use disability insurance as a means of
vote buying because individuals who were not suﬃciently disabled would not be allowed
onto the DI rolls. This paper identiﬁes a speciﬁc mechanism for how misclassiﬁcations
and state inconsistencies may underlie misuses of social welfare program by political ﬁg-
ures. The average estimates presented in this paper account for about 10 percent of
the rise DI over the two-decade time period examined in this paper. However, much
of the diﬀerence occurred over the same time period as the rise in DI rolls suggesting
this political eﬀect may be particularly relevant for the rise in DI and its implications
for labor force participation. Moreover, while we identify governors as a source for the
politicization of DI, there may be other ways in which state politicians more generally
exploit the inherent principle-agent problem set up by the administration of the federal
DI programs.
Overall, the changes we ﬁnd are both signiﬁcant and substantial. Unfortunately, we
are not able to make strong statements about the social welfare impact of this politiciza-
tion of DI allowances because we have little information about who is being allowed onto
the rolls. If governors are simply providing some form of social insurance or long-term
unemployment insurance for individuals who could not be employed and might otherwise
suﬀer severe ﬁnancial hardship then this use of DI to provide a stop-gap safety net may
be net-beneﬁcial. On the other hand, if individuals who would otherwise be employed
or actively seeking employment are entering DI, then the program may be quite socially
costly. The social welfare implications of the rise in DI rolls and its relationship to this
34particular mechanism for that rise is therefore left as an area of future research. However,
the results provide a cautionary tale for governments seeking to reduce costs from ad-
ministration. Monitoring in the form of low cost, not very credible threats is not simply
ineﬀective but may actually be counter-productive. In this case, the monitoring system
actually facilitates misuse of the system and higher DI rolls, likely far outweighing the
costs needed to more eﬀectively monitor state determination services. Thus we would
recommend either a single agent structure, through federalization of DI or a more strict
monitoring system with credible, costly penalties, in order to more eﬃciently administer
DI and SSI.
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Figure 4: SSI allowance rates
39Table 1: Summary Statistics for Disability Application and State Demographic Variables
N Mean Standard Dev Min Max
Panel A: Disability Application Variables
DI Applications 950 11,581 12,088 540 68,524
DI Allowance Rate 950 0.432 0.074 0.240 0.650
SSI Applications 950 15,759 20,501 214 136,419
DI and SSI Combined Allowance Rates 950 0.293 0.068 0.130 0.550
DI Total Applications (DI + Concurrent Applications) 950 20,907 21,353 870 139,725
DI Total Allowance Rates (DI + Concurrent Rates) 950 0.371 0.070 0.200 0.620
Panel B: State Demographic and Economic Variables
Unemployment Rate 950 0.060 0.022 0.020 0.180
Unemployment Rate from 1984-2000 800 0.056 0.018 0.020 0.130
Labor Force Participation Rate 950 0.669 0.040 0.510 0.760
DI Replacement Rate 950 0.365 0.046 0.250 0.549
UI replacement rate 950 0.370 0.053 0.200 0.530
Real Family Assistance per capital (
$1982) 864 0.040 0.025 0.005 0.132
Mean personal income (x1000) 950 19.496 5.744 8.990 37.547
Fraction of population below poverty line 950 0.138 0.042 0.030 0.280
Fraction of population below 100-125% of poverty 950 0.048 0.014 0.010 0.090
Fraction of population between 125 -150% of poverty 950 0.050 0.014 0.010 0.100
Percentage with health insurance coverage 950 0.754 0.057 0.560 0.880
Fraction of population that is working age 950 0.613 0.023 0.530 0.680
Fraction of population aged 5-17 912 0.191 0.017 0.070 0.269
Fraction of population married 950 0.493 0.023 0.420 0.560
Fraction of population that is white 950 0.807 0.141 0.220 1.000
40Table 2: Summary Statistics for Political Variables
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Gubernatorial Descriptive Variables
First Term Governors 895 0.607 0.489 0.000 1.000
Second Term Governors 895 0.306 0.461 0.000 1.000
Third Term or Later Governors 895 0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000
Governor is a Democrat 912 0.487 0.500 0.000 1.000
Governor’s Age 912 53.50 7.90 34.00 78.00
Panel B: Gubernatorial Outcome Variables
Incumbents Lost Re-election 234 0.128 0.335 0.000 1.000
Incumbents could not run for re-election 905 0.239 0.427 0.000 1.000
Incumbents eligible to run but did not 839 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
Percent of votes captured by winner 250 56.88 7.69 35.40 82.40
Governors won with a margin of greater than 10 percentage points 950 0.625 0.484 0.000 1.000
Panel C: Rules Impacting Gubernatorial Inﬂuence/Power
Governors has a line-item veto 912 0.854 0.353 0.000 1.000
Super-majority requirements for tax or expenditure increase 900 0.183 0.387 0.000 1.000
State has a limitation on tax or expenditure increases 900 0.453 0.498 0.000 1.000
State has a restrictive tax/expenditure limitations 900 0.258 0.438 0.000 1.000
Panel D: Other Political Variables
One party received more than 60 percent of votes 384 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000
Fraction of state senate members who are democrats 891 0.573 0.176 0.114 1.000
Fraction of state house or assembly members who are democrats 892 0.567 0.173 0.157 0.952
Fraction of state senate members who are women 912 0.191 0.085 0.016 0.433
Fraction of state house or assembly members who are women 912 0.142 0.093 0.000 0.469
Governor and legislative majority are of opposite parties 912 0.475 0.500 0.000 1.000
Governor and the President are of the same party 950 0.382 0.486 0.000 1.000
Governor and the President are of diﬀerent parties 950 0.618 0.486 0.000 1.000
Governor is a Republican and the President is a Democrat 909 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000
Percentage of expenditures that are deﬁcit spending 864 0.438 0.080 0.238 0.705
41Table 3: Estimates of Diﬀerences in Allowance Rates by Gubernatorial Term Length
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable Disability Insurance (DI) Al-
lowance Rate
Concurrent (DI + SSI) Allowance
Rate
Disability Insurance (DI) Log-
applications
Concurrent (DI + SSI) Log-
applications
mean 43.90 30.08 892.8 870.8
=1 if multi-term governor 1.31** 1.36* 0.99** 1.67** 1.61* 1.34*** -2.36 -0.58 0.35 -2.21 -1.15 -1.71
(0.63) (0.79) (0.43) (0.70) (0.80) (0.45) (1.56) (1.42) (1.62) (1.86) (1.75) (2.38)
=1 if governor cannot -1.28 -1.00 -0.85* -1.88** -1.66** -0.87* 3.46* 1.77 0.60 3.88 3.17 0.71
run again (0.78) (0.79) (0.47) (0.73) (0.70) (0.45) (2.01) (1.81) (1.89) (2.35) (1.98) (2.61)
=1 if the previous governor 0.84 0.61 0.21 0.80* -0.02 1.38 -0.26 -3.23
is from the same party (0.70) (0.42) (0.64) (0.43) (1.39) (1.80) (2.17) (2.43)
Employed/Population 31.38 18.83** -1.78 2.41 -260.74*** -291.71*** -225.78*** -345.18***
(20.81) (8.24) (21.78) (7.64) (40.59) (34.60) (61.97) (50.57)
Mean personal income -0.02 -0.20*** 0.02 -0.27*** 0.25 1.54*** -0.43 0.07
(0.21) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07) (0.65) (0.31) (0.67) (0.43)
% of pop below 100% 0.46 -10.50* -7.52 -20.60*** 14.64 6.62 2.04 34.38
of poverty level (14.60) (6.35) (10.65) (6.16) (23.17) (23.60) (33.05) (31.17)
% of working age pop -22.91 38.54*** 4.21 71.40*** -35.08 253.81*** 46.21 133.58**
(18¡=age¡=64) (22.48) (12.76) (22.59) (12.46) (48.59) (45.36) (59.05) (63.37)
Married -11.72 -38.04*** -29.56* -52.42*** 104.72*** -69.09* -26.31 3.44
(17.25) (11.15) (16.57) (10.91) (37.73) (41.64) (51.19) (57.62)
White 0.84 9.05*** 6.35 2.78 -24.15 -221.57*** -3.74 -238.56***
(11.72) (3.13) (9.87) (2.49) (30.57) (16.82) (29.01) (24.34)
Age-Adjusted-Rate -0.00 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.09 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
DI replacement rate -1.96 0.34 11.02 -1.63 -110.60** -72.29*** -203.49*** -253.09***
(17.02) (5.88) (15.77) (6.13) (47.32) (25.01) (62.38) (33.50)
UI replacement rate 1.51 -2.62 10.88 9.55** 27.91 3.02 38.99 -36.61
(7.25) (4.52) (9.20) (4.48) (20.40) (23.09) (37.09) (30.25)
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered Standard Errors Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N
Estimation Method OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS
Observations 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749
R-squared 0.79 0.80 – 0.73 0.73 – 0.99 0.99 – 0.99 0.99 –
Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions
all include additional controls for state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.
4
2Table 4: Estimates of Diﬀerences in Allowance Rates by Gubernatorial Term Length for
three diﬀerent time periods: 1982–86, 1987–92, 1993–00
(1) (2) (3) (4)















=1 if multiterm in 1982-85 -0.03 -0.47 0.19 -2.96
(0.89) (1.07) (2.31) (3.45)
=1 if multiterm in 1987-92 1.00 1.95** 0.07 0.27
(0.88) (0.88) (1.55) (2.32)
=1 if multiterm in 1993-00 1.40* 1.23 0.19 -1.93
(0.77) (0.73) (2.01) (2.38)
State FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Clustered Standard Errors Y Y Y Y
Estimation Method OLS OLS GLS OLS
Observations 893 893 893 893
R-squared 0.81 0.73 0.99 0.99
Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the .10 [.05] (.01)
are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls for state marriage rates and
age-adjusted state death rates.
43Table 5: Estimates of Diﬀerences in Allowance Rates by Gubernatorial Term Length for Subgroups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)







































Panel A: Dependent Variable is Disability Insurance (DI) Only Allowance Rate
=1 if multi-term governor 1.53** 2.46*** 1.11* 1.46* 1.98** 2.82** 2.85*** 0.23
(0.60) (0.84) (0.63) (0.84) (0.78) (1.12) (0.90) (1.02)
=1 if the previous governor is from the
same party
0.91* 2.62** 0.32 0.73 1.74** 0.74 1.10 1.06
(0.55) (1.03) (0.75) (0.80) (0.74) (1.22) (0.88) (0.97)
=1 if governor cannot run again -1.15* -2.89*** -1.15 -2.78*** -1.32 -4.29*** -3.16*** -1.07
(0.63) (0.90) (0.75) (0.83) (0.91) (0.95) (1.04) (1.03)
Panel B; Dependent Variable is Concurrent (DI + SSI) Allowance Rate
=1 if multi-term governor 1.60** 1.69** 1.47* 1.75** 2.09** 3.18*** 2.35*** -0.05
(0.64) (0.82) (0.79) (0.89) (0.91) (1.06) (0.84) (1.18)
=1 if the previous governor is from the
same party
0.21 1.37 0.10 0.55 1.03 0.37 0.63 0.55
(0.53) (0.86) (0.75) (0.83) (0.71) (1.02) (0.80) (1.09)
=1 if governor cannot run again -1.67*** -2.20** -1.75** -2.93*** -1.78* -3.47*** -2.72*** -0.71
(0.62) (0.92) (0.82) (0.85) (0.96) (0.88) (0.96) (1.17)
Observations 745 265 329 371 317 144 368 287
Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***).
Regressions all include additional controls for state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.
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4Table 6: Estimates of Gubernatorial Learning Separate from Electoral Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Disability Insurance (DI) Allowance
Rate (in%)
Concurrent (DI + SSI) Allowance Rate
(in%)
mean 44.02 30.15
=1 if multi-term governor 1.36* 1.43 1.61* 1.62*
(0.80) (1.04) (0.80) (0.96)
=1 if governor will serve -0.56 -1.20
more than one term (0.85) (1.03)
=1 if previous governor is 0.84 1.67 1.40* 0.21 0.36 0.84
from the same party (0.70) (1.01) (0.81) (0.64) (0.94) (0.70)
=1 if governor cannot -1.01 -1.53 -2.20* -1.67** -1.75* -2.52***
run again (0.79) (0.97) (1.10) (0.70) (0.94) (0.71)
State FE Y N Y Y N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Governor FE N Y N N Y N
Observations 745 745 457 745 745 457
R-squared 0.80 0.88 0.84 0.73 0.84 0.78
Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the .10 [.05]
(.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all include additional controls for year ﬁxed eﬀects,
state marriage rates and age-adjusted state death rates.
4
5Table 7: Estimates of Diﬀerences in the Log-Number of DI Beneﬁciaries
by Diagnostic Type and by Gubernatorial Term Length
Dep. Variable Multiterm SE Multiterm SE
Change in beneﬁciaries State FE Governor FE
Congenital 0.01* (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Endocrinous 0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Infectious 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Injuries 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
Total mental -0.03 (0.06) -0.06 (0.08)
Retardation -0.01 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03)
Other mental -0.02 (0.05) -0.01 (0.08)
Neoplasm 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Blood -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Circulatory system -0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Digestive system 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Genitourinary 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Muscoloskeletal -0.07 (0.04) -0.04 (0.06)
Nervous 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03)
Respiratory 0.00 (0.02) -0.05** (0.02)
Skin -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Other mental 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Based on the DI statistical supplements from 2000 to 2007. Standard errors clustered
by state in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcant at the .10 [.05] (.01) are marked with *[**](***). Regressions all
include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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